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This paper reviews the move from virtual reality exposure-based therapy to augmented
reality exposure-based therapy (ARET). Unlike virtual reality (VR), which entails a complete
virtual environment (VE), augmented reality (AR) limits itself to producing certain virtual
elements to then merge them into the view of the physical world. Although, the general
public may only have become aware of AR in the last few years, AR type applications have
been around since beginning of the twentieth century. Since, then, technological develop-
ments have enabled an ever increasing level of seamless integration of virtual and physical
elements into one view. Like VR, AR allows the exposure to stimuli which, due to various
reasons, may not be suitable for real-life scenarios. As such, AR has proven itself to be a
medium through which individuals suffering from specific phobia can be exposed “safely”
to the object(s) of their fear, without the costs associated with programing complete VEs.
Thus, ARET can offer an efficacious alternative to some less advantageous exposure-based
therapies. Above and beyond presenting what has been accomplished in ARET, this paper
covers some less well-known aspects of the history of AR, raises some ARET related
issues, and proposes potential avenues to be followed. These include the type of mea-
sures to be used to qualify the user’s experience in an augmented reality environment,
the exclusion of certain AR-type functionalities from the definition of AR, as well as the
potential use of ARET to treat non-small animal phobias, such as social phobia.
Keywords: virtual reality, augmented reality, phobia, exposure therapy, synthetic environments
According to Moore’s law, the number of transistors on integrated
circuits doubles approximately every 2 years (Moore, 1965). This
growth leads to an exponential growth of technological capabil-
ities. Innovative minds are applying the potential of these new
technologies in what, historically, may have been technology aver-
sive fields; mental health was one of those fields. Today, however,
it is widely recognized that new technologies such as virtual and
augmented realities are showing strong potential in that same field,
and more specifically, in the treatment of phobia (Wrzesien et al.,
2011a).
The objective of this paper is twofold. First, it reviews the move
from virtual reality (VR) systems to augmented reality (AR) sys-
tems in the treatment of phobias. Second, it highlights four issues
relating to AR: (a) qualifying an AR experience necessitates a set
of AR specific instruments [not necessarily those used to qual-
ify a virtual environment (VE) experience]; (b) historically, AR
applications have been around a long time before the term “AR”
was assigned to the concept; (c) presently, certain AR-type func-
tionalities are excluded from the definition of AR; and (d) the
use of augmented reality exposure-based therapy (ARET) has
advantages over virtual reality exposure-based therapy (VRET),
but these advantages could be exploited beyond the treatment of
small animal phobia.
To this aim, the article first addresses some of the evolutions
that have led to the use of AR in the treatment of specific pho-
bias. To establish the framework of AR, it is useful to distinguish
it from VR. Thus, the paper presents some definitions relating to
the technology (VE, VR, and immersion), some of the concepts
commonly used to quantify and qualify a user’s experience of vir-
tual stimuli (presence, realism, and reality), as well as some of
the non-mental health applications of VR. After having covered
these basics, the focus shifts toward mental health. More specifi-
cally, the implications of suffering from a phobia and two of the
possible (traditional) treatments, in imago and in vivo exposure-
based therapies, are presented. Next, VRET, the “direct ancestor”
to ARET, is introduced; its documented successes, as well some of
as its advantages over traditional exposure-based methods are pre-
sented. After this overview, the focus shifts toward AR, including
how it distinguishes itself from VR, some of its advantages over VR,
and what criteria must be met to consider a functionality as AR. At
this point, the instruments presently used to measure an AR user’s
experience are discussed, and some concepts to be measured in AR
are proposed. The next section addresses the history of AR. This
is accomplished in two parts. While the first covers, some of the
major events that occurred after the coining of the phrase “aug-
mented reality,” the second addresses the period going back to the
roots of AR, a time-frame less covered by previous publications.
From this historic account will emerge an issue relating to the
definition of AR: the present one leaves certain AR-type function-
alities nameless. A solution will be proposed to close this semantic
gap. Next, the AR enabling technologies, and some of the technical
challenges faced by the developers are put forward. A variety of AR
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applications are listed. In particular, publications pertaining to the
use of ARET are reviewed; these eight studies either test the effi-
cacy of ARET protocols, compare ARET protocols to other types
of exposure-based protocols, compare ARET technologies, or sim-
ply quantify users’ experiences in an ARET environment. Finally,
the last discussion point addresses the limited use of ARET in the
treatment of phobias, other than small animal phobias. One of
the plausible reasons behind this self-imposed restriction, a pos-
sible way to break free of it, as well as the potentially resulting
opportunity to expand ARET to the treatment of social phobia are
discussed. To close, a conclusion reiterates the major points of the
paper.
VIRTUAL REALITY
VIRTUALITY AND ASSOCIATED CONCEPTS
Virtual environment
The exact definition of the word “virtuality” depends on the con-
text of its use. However, in the domain of VEs, Theodore Nelson’s
definition is pertinent; he defines the virtuality of a thing as the
“seeming” of that thing (Skagestad, 1998). Indeed, a VE consists
of objects or entities seemingly “real” because they share at least
one attribute of the “real thing” (usually the appearance), without
sharing all of its physical characteristics (volume, weight, surface
friction, etc.).
A VE can be defined as a 3D digital space generated by comput-
ing technology (e.g., the scenario of a video game). It is comprised
of visual stimuli projected on a surface (e.g., a wall, a computer
screen, screens of a head mounted display) and, generally, acoustic
stimuli produced by an electronic device (e.g., a headset, speakers).
Further to these, a VE may also expose the user to haptic (contact),
olfactory, or even gustatory stimuli (Sundgren et al., 1992; Burdea
and Coiffet, 1994; Kalawsky, 2000; Fuchs et al., 2006). A VE aims
to “extract” the user from the “physical” world and “insert” him
into a synthetic world; this is accomplished by exposing him to
synthetic sensory information that emulates real life stimuli (see
Figure 1).
Virtual reality
Virtual reality is an application that, in very near real time, allows
a user to navigate through, and interact with, a VE (Pratt et al.,
1995). Depending on the type of system and programing, the user
may interact with the environment from an egocentric point of
view (also known as “first person point of view”) or an allocentric
point of view (also known as “third person point of view”); in the
case of the latter, the user moves a virtual representation of himself
(called “avatar”). The user may also act upon virtual objects, and
even interact with virtual beings (e.g., persons, animals). Com-
pared to more passive media such as radio and television, the
higher levels of cognitive, social, and physical interactivities of
VR can boost the effect of the VE on the user (Fox et al., 2009).
In more immersive egocentric VR systems, the user can inter-
act with the VE via his own movements by wearing at least one
input device (known as “tracker”). The latter detects its own posi-
tion in space and transmits it continuously to a computer which:
(a) continuously compares this data with the database associated
to the VE; (b) determines the synthetic stimuli to be triggered;
and (c) triggers the output devices to deploy them. All of this is
FIGURE 1 | Example of a virtual environment. Credit, Laboratory of
Cyberpsychology, Université du Québec en Outaouais.
accomplished in very near real time and can implicate multiple
sensory modalities. Generally, worn at head level, a tracker may
support three degrees of freedom (3-DOF) or six degrees of free-
dom (6-DOF) tracking; while a 3-DOF tracker allows tracking of
head rotation only, the 6-DOF version tracks head rotation as well
as horizontal and vertical displacements. Trackers may also be used
to track specific body parts (e.g., the hands). Generally, the user
of a 6-DOF system uses own body movement for small positional
adjustments (turning around, bending down, repositioning, etc.)
and a hand-held device (e.g., joy-stick, space ball, 3D mouse) to
move over greater distances, such as walking from room to room
in an apartment.
Immersion
Factors such as the number of senses stimulated, the number of
and the level of interactions, as well as the fidelity of the synthetic
stimuli contribute to a VR system’s level of immersion (Slater et al.,
2009). This concept corresponds to the quality and the quantity of
the stimuli employed to simulate the environment; it is an objective
characterization of the system (Sanchez-Vives and Slater, 2005). At
the same time, the level of immersion is also dependent on the abil-
ity of the system to isolate the user from stimuli foreign to the VE
(e.g., room lights and external noise). Ma and Zheng (2011) use
the following guidelines to distinguish between non-immersive,
semi-immersive, and immersive VR systems: a non-immersive VR
system employs conventional graphics workstation with a monitor,
a keyboard and a mouse; a semi-immersive system uses a relatively
high performance graphics computing system coupled with a large
surface to display the visual scene; and an immersive VR system
projects the visual scene into some kind of head mounted device –
or large projection surfaces “encasing” the user – completely filling
the user’s field of view (see Figure 2). The level of immersion, in
turn, affects the user’s experience in the VE. Three of the dominant
concepts used to measure the quality of the user’s experience are:
the feeling of presence, the level of realism,and the degree of reality.
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FIGURE 2 | Examples of immersion levels: (A) a non-immersive VR system, (B) a semi-immersive VR system, and (C) an immersive VR system. Credits:
(A,B) Bouchard et al. (2012a) by (SAGE Publications) reprinted by permission of SAGE (C) Laboratory of Cyberpsychology, Université du Québec en Outaouais.
Presence, realism, and reality
While various definitions of presence have been proposed, Heeter
(1992) views presence as a complex feeling composed of three
dimensions: (a) personal presence refers to the feeling of actually
being in the VE (versus in the physical room where the immersion
takes place); (b) environmental presence refers to the feeling that
the VE seems to acknowledge the user by reacting to his actions;
and (c) social presence refers to the feeling of not being alone in the
VE (Heeter, 1992). Compared to other definitions, the strengths of
this one include its fidelity to the actual term “presence,” its sim-
plicity, as well as its ability to account for the interactions between
the user and the virtual location, objects, and animated entities;
thus, Heeter’s conceptualization of presence will serve as reference
to this article. The concept of presence, however, is not unique to
VEs: watching a movie, a play or a painting, as well as reading a
text or listening to the radio can induce a feeling of presence (Nash
et al., 2000).
The level of realism corresponds to the degree of convergence
between the expectations of the user and the actual experience in
the VE (Baños et al., 2000). Thus, a virtual stimulus that meets
the expectations of the user, such as an orange that smells like an
orange, is likely to be rated as more realistic as that same orange if
it smelled like nothing at all, or if it smelled like fish.
The level of reality refers to the level by which the user experi-
ences the immersion as authentic (Baños et al., 2000). It is felt in
response to the stimuli. Thus, a higher level of realism should be
associated with a higher level of reality.
VR APPLICATIONS
Today, the fields in which VR is used are numerous; they include
education, health care, communication, engineering, and enter-
tainment (Schuemie, 2003). Within these fields, VR applications
may be used for a variety of purposes including pain manage-
ment (Gold et al., 2007; Hoffman et al., 2008), virtual “visits” of
construction projects in development (Brooks et al., 1992), the
development of virtual classrooms (Moreno and Mayer, 2007),
and collaborative work environments in which the users interact
via avatars (Normand et al., 1999; Benford et al., 2001; Joslin et al.,
2004; Reeves et al., 2008).
Often, VR is employed as a training tool. In such a func-
tion, its advantages include reduced cost, interactivity, and safety.
Indeed, VR can offer financially advantageous active learning
experiences involving scenarios that are too difficult and/or too
dangerous to practice “real world.” Furthermore, its interactivity
(Bailenson et al., 2005) as well as the possibility to pre-program
a variety of training scenarios at multiple levels of difficulty can
facilitate better learning. VR training applications include: visual
inspections of aircraft with various structural flaws (e.g., Vora
et al., 2002), the operation of various vehicles (e.g., Tichon et al.,
2006), rapid and efficacious decision making by medical doc-
tors (e.g., de Leo et al., 2003; Mantovani et al., 2003; Johnsen
et al., 2006; Kenny et al., 2007) and by soldiers (e.g., Hill et al.,
2003) in stressful situations, pre-deployment inter-cultural com-
munication training prior to military deployments (e.g., Deaton
et al., 2005), emergency management (e.g., Viciana-Abad et al.,
2004), surgical procedures (e.g., O’Toole et al., 1998; Harders
et al., 2008; Spitzer and Ackerman, 2008), rehabilitation (Rose
et al., 1996; Jaffe et al., 2004; Crosbie et al., 2007), stress man-
agement (e.g., Bouchard et al., 2012b), and fear management
training in the face of a phobia inducing stimulus (e.g., Côté
and Bouchard, 2005). The latter form of “training” is more com-
monly known as VRET. Indeed, VRET is essentially a training
activity during which an individual learns to master a task that he
is incapable of carrying out: facing a particular stimulus with-
out experiencing unwanted psychological and/or physiological
reactions.
PHOBIA
DEFINITION
While about 9% of the citizens of the United States were reported
to suffer from a specific phobia (Gadermann et al., 2012), 60–80%
of those affected have been reported not to seek treatment (Agras
et al., 1969; Boyd et al., 1990; Magee et al., 1996; Essau et al., 2000).
Suffering from a phobia means an individual experiences excessive
anxiety when exposed to a certain stimulus; the trigger stimulus
may be a specific entity (e.g., an animal species) or a situation (e.g.,
addressing a group of people, driving). In association to the ele-
vated stress and anxiety, the individual may experience increased
heartbeat, sweating, and dry mouth (Abate et al., 2011). In either
case, the unrealistic and excessive fear of the stimulus can lead to
avoidance behaviors that interfere with the subject’s life. Numer-
ous studies suggest that exposure-based treatment is effective in
treating phobic fear and avoidance behavior (e.g., Öst, 1989; Öst
et al., 1991a, 1997). A lack of treatment can lead to a self-feeding
spiral where increasing unrealistic fear feeds avoidance behaviors
which, in turn, feed further fear. Untreated, this condition can
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lead to significant social and economic costs to society (Kessler
and Greenberg, 2002; Kessler et al., 2008).
TREATMENT OF PHOBIA
In imago and in vivo exposure-based therapies
Years of empirical work point to the efficacy of exposure-based
therapy across a variety of anxiety disorders (Richard et al., 2007),
and various theories have been proposed to explain its mecha-
nisms of action. These include: the Two-Factor Theory of Fear
Acquisition and Maintenance (Mowrer, 1960), the Bioinforma-
tional Theory (Lang, 1977), the Emotional Processing Theory
(Rachman, 1980), the Emotional Processing Theory Model (Foa
and Kozak, 1986), a revised version of the Emotional Processing
Theory (Foa and McNally, 1996), the Perceived Control and Self-
Efficacy Theory (Mineka and Thomas, 1999), as well as various
Neural Networking Models (e.g., Tryon, 2005). Exposure-based
treatments do not limit themselves to exposure sessions: the expo-
sure is just the behavioral component of what usually amounts to a
cognitive-behavioral protocol. Thus, an exposure-based treatment
includes a broader set of behavioral and cognitive therapeutic
techniques, including case formulation, cognitive restructuring,
relapse prevention, etc.
The exposure component generally implies a gradual hierar-
chical exposure to the object of the fear in a safe and controlled
way. The exposure aims to help the patient convincingly learn that
the consequences he fears do not necessarily happen. According to
the Emotional Processing Theory (Rachman, 1980; Foa and Kozak,
1986; Foa and McNally,1996), the exposure works because it allows
the patient to fully experience the activation and subsequent nat-
ural reduction of fear in presence of the phobia inducing stimulus
(Abramowitz, 2013). Thus, the use of “crutches” (e.g., relaxation
exercises) or downright avoidance behaviors (e.g., behaviorally or
cognitively ignoring the stimulus) can be detrimental to the clinical
efficacy of the exposure (Abramowitz, 2013). More recent models
explaining the therapeutic mechanisms of exposure (e.g., Bouton
and King, 1983; Craske et al., 2008) propose that the result of a
successful exposure-based treatment is not the disappearance of
the previously learned association between the stimulus and per-
ceived threat, but the creation of a newly learned association that
competes with the old dysfunctional one; repeated exposures, and
non-avoidance behaviors are meant to establish, strengthen, and
maintain the functional response such that it may “overpower” the
dysfunctional response, and continue to do so in the long term.
Historically, exposure has been accomplished in vivo (facing the
actual stimulus or a physical representation of it; see Figure 3) and
in imago (mental imaging of the stimulus). However, each of these
techniques has major drawbacks: while a patient may be unwilling
to face the actual threat in vivo, it might prove too difficult for a
patient to mentally visualize the anxiety inducing threat. In fact,
it has been reported that when patients find out that the therapy
entails facing the threat, about 25% of them either refuse the ther-
apy or terminate it (Marks, 1978, 1992; García-Palacios et al., 2001,
2007).
Virtual reality exposure-based therapy
Enabled by technological progress, the search for a less threat-
ening and a more practical alternative to IVET has lead to the
introduction of VRET (see Figure 3). During VRET, the patient
is immersed in a VE where he faces a virtual representation of
the threat. While the patients’ acceptance of such a protocol is
generally higher than that of IVET (García-Palacios et al., 2001),
the efficacy of the exposure-based treatment is not sacrificed.
FIGURE 3 |Three types of exposure-based methods: (A) in vivo exposure, (B) virtual reality exposure (bottom photo shows the user’s view), and (C)
augmented reality exposure (bottom photo shows the user’s view). Credits: (A–C) Laboratory of Cyberpsychology, Université du Québec en Outaouais.
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Indeed, the use of VRET has proved itself effective in treating
specific phobias such as acrophobia (Emmelkamp et al., 2001,
2002; Krijn et al., 2004), arachnophobia (García-Palacios et al.,
2002), aviophobia (Wiederhold, 1999; Rothbaum et al., 2000,
2002; Maltby et al., 2002; Mühlberger et al., 2003; Botella et al.,
2004), claustrophobia (Botella et al., 2000), spider phobia (Michal-
iszyn et al., 2010), and driving phobia (Wald and Taylor, 2003;
Walshe et al., 2003). In fact, a meta-analysis by Powers and
Emmelkamp (2008) suggests that, in the domain of phobias and
anxiety disorders,VRET is slightly, but significantly, more effective
than IVET.
Virtual reality exposure-based therapy does enjoy other advan-
tages over IVET (Botella et al., 2005). These include better control
of the anxiety inducing stimulus which, of course, poses no real
threat (i.e., a virtual dog can’t bite). Thus, the patient need not fear
being hurt. The exposure scenarios, however complex they may
be, can be stopped, paused, restarted as well as repeated, when-
ever and, for as many times as deemed necessary. Furthermore,
the entire exposure process can be completed in the safety and
privacy of the practitioner’s office. In the case of animal pho-
bia, VRET dispenses the therapist of the problems associated with
finding, taking care of, and handling live animals. Finally, some
therapists find VRET more acceptable, helpful, and ethical than
IVET (Richard and Gloster, 2007).
AUGMENTED REALITY
DISTINGUISHING AUGMENTED REALITY FROM VIRTUAL REALITY
With time, further technological advances led to the development
of another method of exposure: ARET (see Figure 3). In contrast
to VR systems which generate a complete VE, AR systems enhance
the non-synthetic environment by introducing synthetic elements
to the user’s perception of the world (see Figure 4). While VR
substitutes the existing physical environment with a virtual one,
AR uses virtual elements to build upon the existing environment
(Azuma, 1997; Azuma et al., 2001). Milgram and Kishino (1994)
present AR as a form of mixed reality (MR), that is, a “particular
subclass of VR related technologies” (Milgram and Kishino, 1994,
p. 1321), which, via a single display, expose the user to electron-
ically merged synthetic and non-synthetic elements. Milgram’s
Reality–Virtuality Continuum serves to illustrate where MR sit-
uates itself in comparison to real and VEs (see Figure 5). Between
these two poles exist various combination levels of synthetic and
non-synthetic elements: to the right of center are the environ-
ments where virtuality provides the surrounding environment
(augmented virtuality), and to the left of center are the environ-
ments where reality provides the surrounding environment (AR).
It is important to note that AR does not limit itself to introduc-
ing virtual elements into the physical world, it may also inhibit
the perception of physical objects by overlaying them with virtual
representations, such as a virtual objects or even virtual empty
spaces. Although AR can be extended to hearing, touch, as well as
smell (Azuma et al., 2001), this article will limit itself to the sense
of vision.
In contrast to a VR user, the user of AR does not “depart”
the space he occupies, thus he “maintains his sense of presence”
in the non-synthetic world (Botella et al., 2005). He is, how-
ever, put in co-presence with virtual elements that are blended
FIGURE 4 | Example of a non-synthetic environment (the researcher in
the laboratory) augmented by a synthetic element (the small person
standing on a non-synthetic table). Credit, Laboratory of
Cyberpsychology, Université du Québec en Outaouais.
into the non-synthetic world. Azuma et al. (2001) propose that,
to be considered AR, a system must: (1) combine real and vir-
tual objects in a real environment; (2) run interactively, and
in real time; and (3) register (align) real and virtual objects
with each other. The purposes of the virtual elements include
enhancing the experience and/or the knowledge of the user
(Berryman, 2012). They could represent advisories (e.g., name of
a building, distance to destination) or entities (e.g., an object, a
person).
ABOUT QUALIFYING THE AR EXPERIENCE
Thus, experiencing an AR environment is fundamentally different
from experiencing a VE: unlike the user of a VE, the user of an
augmented reality environment (ARE) is not “transported” to a
different location, and consequently, there is no immersion per se.
Instead, it is the virtual elements that are transported into, and
aligned with, the user’s world. It could be said that in a VE, the
user “intrudes” in the virtual world, while in an ARE, it is the vir-
tual objects that “intrude” in the user’s world. Thus, the means by
which the quality of a user’s experience is measured may need to
be modified slightly. However, as Table 1 suggests, the instruments
used to qualify a user’s experience in AR are often the same as those
used in VR.
In an ARE, measures of realism (degree of convergence between
the expectations of the user and the actual experience in the VE)
and reality (level to which the user experiences the hybrid envi-
ronment as authentic) are still pertinent. However, this may not
be the case for presence. If Heeter’s (1992) conceptualization of
presence is used as reference, it can be argued that measures of the
environmental presence (the feeling that the environment seems
to acknowledge the user’s movements by reacting to his actions;
Heeter, 1992) and social presence (the feeling of not being alone in
the environment; Heeter, 1992) can also be pertinent to qualify the
experience of the user in an ARE. However, unlike VR where social
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FIGURE 5 | Simplified representation of a “virtuality continuum”
(Milgram and Kishino, 1994). Credits: (A,B,D) Laboratory of
Cyberpsychology, Université du Québec en Outaouais (C) Video frame
from “Vrui on Oculus Rift with Razer Hydra and Kinect,”
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IERHs7yYsWI (Preview). Image
courtesy of Oliver Kreylos.
Table 1 | Clinical and experience related measures taken during past ARET studies.
Clinical measures Experience related measures
Botella et al.
(2005)
Behavior avoidance test (BAT) (adapted from Öst et al., 1991b) Presence (two questions relating to presence)
Degree of belief in catastrophic thought (assessed daily on scale from 0 to 100%) Reality judgment (one question related to reality
judgment)Fear and avoidance scales (adapted from Marks and Mathews, 1979)
Fear of spiders questionnaire (FSQ) (Szymanski and O’Donohue, 1995)
Spider phobia beliefs questionnaire (SPBQ) (adapted from Arntz et al., 1993)
Subjective units of discomfort scale (SUDS) (Wolpe, 1969)
Juan et al.
(2005)
Fear and avoidance scale (adapted from Marks and Mathews, 1979) Presence (two questions relating to presence)
Subjective units of discomfort scale (SUDS) (Wolpe, 1969) Reality judgment (one question related to reality
judgment)
Botella et al.
(2010)
Behavior avoidance test (BAT) (adapted from Öst et al., 1991b) N/A
Degree of belief in catastrophic thought (assessed on a 10-point Likert scale)
Fear of spiders questionnaire (FSQ) (Szymanski and O’Donohue, 1995)
Spider phobia beliefs questionnaire (SPBQ) (adapted from Arntz et al., 1993)
Subjective units of discomfort scale (SUDS) (Wolpe, 1969)
Target behaviors (adapted from Marks and Mathews, 1979)
Bretón-López
et al. (2010)
Subjective units of discomfort scale (SUDS) (Wolpe, 1969) Presence (two items from presence and reality
judgment questionnaire; Baños et al., 2005)
Reality judgment (assessed on a 10-point scale)
Wrzesien et al.
(2011a)
Anxiety (assessed on a 10-point Likert scale) N/A
Avoidance (assessed on a 10-point Likert scale)
Behavioral avoidance test (assessed on a 13-point Likert scale)
Belief in catastrophic thoughts (assessed on a 10-point Likert scale)
Wrzesien et al.
(2011b)
Anxiety (assessed on a 10-point Likert scale) N/A
Avoidance (assessed on a 10-point Likert scale)
Behavioral avoidance test (BAT) (adapted from Öst, 2000)
Belief in catastrophic thoughts (assessed on a 10-point Likert scale)
Wrzesien et al.
(2013)
Self efficacy belief (assessed on a seven-point scale) Presence and reality judgment questionnaire
(assessed on 10-point scales)Spiders and cockroach anxiety and avoidance questionnaire (assessed on a
seven-point scale)
Subjective units of discomfort scale (SUDS) (assessed on a 10-point scale)
presence measures the level of “togetherness”between the user and
virtual agents, in AR, the level of “togetherness” between the user
and individuals physically present in the environment may also
be of interest. On the other hand, a measure of personal presence
does not seem pertinent in an ARE; indeed, the user is not “trans-
ported” to a different location, and thus, the value of measuring
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the level of personal presence in a location the user never left may
be questionable.
On the other hand, a measure addressing the alignment of real
and virtual elements could contribute to an overall assessment of
the quality of a user’s experience in an ARE; this could be in the
form of a measure of co-existence between the virtual and the
non-virtual elements. Further co-existence measures could assist
in qualifying the experience of an ARE. These could include co-
existence measures between the user and virtual elements, as well
as between the user and non-virtual elements (this last measure
could be used as a baseline to put the level of co-existence between
user and non-virtual elements into context).
History of augmented reality
The term “augmented reality” was introduced in 1990 by Tom
Caudell while working on Boeing’s Computer Services’ Adap-
tive Neural Systems Research and Development project in Seattle
(Carmigniani et al., 2011). There, alongside David Mizell, he
developed an application that displayed a plane’s schematics on
the factory floor (Vaughan-Nichols, 2009), thereby saving the
mechanics the difficult task of interpreting abstract diagrams in
manuals (Berryman, 2012). Two further AR pioneering projects
were Rosenberg’s Virtual Fixtures and Feiner and colleagues’
knowledge-based augmented reality for maintenance assistance
(KARMA). Results of the Virtual Fixtures project suggested that
teleoperator performance can be enhanced by overlaying abstract
sensory information in the form of virtual fixtures on top of sen-
sory feedback from a remote environment (Rosenberg, 1993).
KARMA used 3D graphics to guide a user through the steps to
carry out some of the complex tasks of printer maintenance/repair
(Feiner et al., 1993). In 1993, Loral Western Development Labo-
ratories took AR to a new level by introducing AR to live training
involving combat vehicles (Barilleaux, 1999), and in 1994, in a
completely different field, Julie Martin created “Dancing in Cyber-
space,” the first AR theater production featuring dancers and
acrobats interacting with virtual object in real time (Cathy, 2011).
Some of the other important developments for AR include:
Kato and Billinghurst (1999) created AR Toolkit, the first widely
held software to solve tracking and object interaction; the next
year, Thomas et al. (2000) developed ARQuake, the first outdoor
mobile AR video game; the year 2008 saw the development of
applications such as Wikitude, which uses a smartphone’s camera
view, internet, and GPS (or Wifi) positioning to display infor-
mation about the user’s surroundings (Perry, 2008); in 2009, AR
Toolkit was brought to the web browser by Saqoosha (Cameron,
2010), and SiteLens, an application that allows visualization of rel-
evant virtual data directly in the context of the physical site, was
introduced (White and Feiner, 2009); in 2011, Laster Technologies
incorporated AR in ski goggles (e.g., ITR News, 2011), while Total
Immersion created D’Fusion, a platform to design AR projects
for mobile, web based, and professional applications (Maurugeon,
2011); and finally, in 2013, Google began to test Google Glass, a
pair of AR glasses connected wirelessly to the internet via the user’s
cellphone wireless service.
While the coining of the phrase “augmented reality” is an
important historical reference, the concept at the source of the
phrase had made its mark long before 1990. In fact, it was in
1901 that Lyman Frank Baum, an American author of children’s
books, put on paper what may have been the first idea for an AR
application. In his novel titled The Master Key (1901), he wrote:
“The third and last gift of the present series,” resumed the
Demon, “is one no less curious than the Record of Events,
although it has an entirely different value. It is a Character
Marker.”“What’s that?” inquired Rob.
“I will explain. Perhaps you know that your fellow-
creatures are more or less hypocritical. That is, they try to
appear good when they are not, and wise when in reality they
are foolish. They tell you they are friendly when they pos-
itively hate you, and try to make you believe they are kind
when their natures are cruel. This hypocrisy seems to be a
human failing. One of your writers has said, with truth that
among civilized people things is seldom what they seem.”
“I’ve heard that,” remarked Rob.
“On the other hand,” continued the Demon,“some people
with fierce countenances are kindly by nature, and many who
appear to be evil are in reality honorable and trustworthy.
Therefore, that you may judge all your fellow-creatures truly,
and know upon whom to depend, I give you the Character
Marker. It consists of this pair of spectacles. While you wear
them every one you meet will be marked upon the forehead
with a letter indicating his or her character. The good will
bear the letter “G,” the evil the letter “E.” The wise will be
marked with a “W” and the foolish with an “F.” The kind will
show a “K” upon their foreheads and the cruel a letter “C.”
Thus you may determine by a single look the true natures of
all those you encounter.” (Baum, 1901, pp. 37–38)
Although potentially useful, the “character marker” was not devel-
oped into a concrete application. However, around that same
timeframe, an AR-like application saw the light of day: the reflector
(“reflex”) gunsight. The concept behind the gunsight was pub-
lished by Grubb (1901): “the sight which forms the subject of this
paper attains a similar result not by projecting an actual spot of
light or an image on the object but by projecting what is called in
optical language a virtual image upon it” (Grubb, 1901, p. 324).
Although, its first employment is difficult to date exactly, the reflec-
tor gunsight was operational in German fighter aircraft by 1918
(Clarke, 1994). Installed in front of the pilot, and in line with the
aircraft’s gun(s), the reflector gunsight consisted of a 45° angle
glass beam splitter on which an image (e.g., an aiming reticle) was
projected (Clarke, 1994); thus, it superposed virtual elements on
real world elements. Its purpose was to assist pilots in hitting their
targets by providing them with a reference aiming point. However,
according to Azuma and colleagues’ definition, this type of con-
cept cannot be considered an AR system. Indeed, it only met two
of their three criteria of AR: it combines real and virtual objects
in a real environment and it runs interactively, and in real time; it
does not, however, align real and virtual objects with each other.
On the other hand, the reflector gunsight does meet Berryman’s
stated purpose of AR: the enhancement of the experience and/or
the knowledge of the user (Berryman, 2012).
The difficulty of categorizing this type of application as AR per-
sists for the follow-on systems. As it was known that the trajectory
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of the bullets was influenced by the shooting aircraft’s flight para-
meters, the newer generation of gunsights started to take these into
account when displaying the aiming reticle. This type of appli-
cation does, to a certain extent, take real world parameters into
consideration, but it still does not align real and virtual objects.
Thus, it does not quite meet Azuma and colleagues’ definition
of AR.
The first operational system that did meet all three of Azuma
and colleagues’ premises of AR seems to have been the AI Mk VIII
Projector System (earlier variants had been successfully tested but
never entered service). As the name suggests, the radar picture of
the AI Mk VIII radar picture was projected onto the pilot’s wind-
screen, thereby superimposing the virtual cue onto the real world
position of the target aircraft (as seen from the cockpit; Clarke,
1994). Although the alignment of virtual and real elements may
have been somewhat rudimentary, the AI Mk VIII seems to have
been, long before the term “augmented reality” was coined, the
first AR system.
The concept of projecting flight parameters and target informa-
tion on a see-through surface eventually led to the developments
of the head-up display (HUD), the helmet mounted sight (HMS),
and the helmet mounted display (HMD). The latter, invented in
the 1960s by Professor Ivan Sutherland and his graduate student
Bob Sproull, can be considered as one of the major technolog-
ical breakthrough that furthered the development of AR (and
VR; Berryman, 2012). Nicknamed the “The Sword of Damocles”
(see Figure 6) due to the fact it was suspended from the ceiling
over the user, their see-through head mounted display was able to
present simple 3D wireframe models of generated environments
(Sutherland, 1968). In the 1970s and 1980s, the United States Air
Force and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
were among the organizations that further researched AR and its
potential applications (Feiner, 2002). The integration of HMSs
(in the 1970s), and HMDs (in the1980s) in fighter aircraft were
among the concrete results of this research; today’s Google Glasses
can be seen as a technological offspring of the HMD. Although
military applications may have been an important motor in the
development of AR technologies, entertainment oriented applica-
tions, such as Myron Krueger’s Videoplace, also occupy important
places in the history of AR (Dinkla, 1997).
ABOUT THE DEFINITION OF AR
Thus, AR applications had been around long before a term was
assigned to the concept. However, a look back at history and for-
ward to the future of AR also reveals that the present definition
of AR excludes some AR-like functionalities, such as the display
of information that is overlaid onto, but not merged with, the
real world (e.g., speed of car projected onto the inside of the
windshield). As AR functionalities may co-exist with such AR-
like functionalities (e.g., an arrow to indicate where to turn and an
indication of the distance to go before that turn), it could be useful
to find a term that describes functionalities that don’t register real
and virtual objects with each other. Using Azuma and colleagues’
widely accepted definition of AR as an anchor, the authors of the
present paper propose the term “non-registered augmented real-
ity” (NRAR) to describe functionalities that: (1) combine real and
virtual objects in a real environment; and (2) run interactively, and
FIGURE 6 |The Sword of Damocles (circa 1968). Reprinted from
Sherman and Craig (2003), with permission from Elsevier.
in real time; but (3) don’t register (align) real and virtual objects
with each other.
ENABLING TECHNOLOGIES
While the exact configurations of AR systems vary, their common
elements include: (a) a means of providing a geospatial datum
to the synthetic elements; (b) a surface to project the environ-
ment to the user; (c) sufficient processing power to generate the
3-D synthetic elements and merge them with the pointing device’s
input; and (d) adequate graphics power to animate the scene on
the display (see Figure 7). A detailed review of each of the hard-
ware pieces of AR systems is beyond the scope of this paper (for a
more detailed overview of AR technologies, see Carmigniani et al.,
2011), but it is worthwhile to mention some details about possible
methods of geospatial referencing and the types of visual displays.
In order to achieve a near seamless integration of the virtual
elements in the non-synthetic environment, 3D tracking must be
able to define accurately the orientation and position of the user
relative to the scene. To this end, magnetic, mechanical, acoustic,
inertial, optical, or hybrid technologies have been used (Bowman
et al., 2005). These technologies may provide: (a) the user’s and
the virtual elements’ respective positions and orientations on a
geospatial grid (e.g., GPS); or (b) the position and orientation of
the user relative to a reference point recognizable by the pointing
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FIGURE 7 | Example of an AR set-up. Credit, Laboratory of Cyberpsychology, Université du Québec en Outaouais.
device (e.g., a visual marker). In the case of markers, these may be
visible or invisible to the human eye.
The visual displays used in AR may be categorized as projective,
handheld, and head-level devices (Azuma et al., 2001). The latter
can be as bulky as head mounted displays, as light as eyeglasses,
and as inconspicuous as contact lenses. Two types of systems may
display the composite environment to the user: (a) a video see-
through (VST) AR system (Botella et al., 2005; Juan et al., 2005);
and (b) an optical see-through (OST) system (Juan et al., 2007).
While a VST system exposes the user to images composed of a
video feed of the non-synthetic environment merged with syn-
thetic elements, an OST system overlays the synthetic elements on
a transparent surface (e.g., glass) through which the user sees the
non-synthetic environment. It is worthwhile to note that, unlike
an OST system, a VST system requires a means to capture the
non-synthetic environment (e.g., a web cam). In terms of user
experience, a major difference between these two systems is the
effect of computer graphics latency. Indeed, the user of an OST
system may detect a lack of synchronization between the environ-
ment (observed in real time) and the view of the synthetic elements
(displayed after some degree of graphics latency). A VST system,
on the other hand, can delay the display of the video feed to syn-
chronize video and graphics; as a result, the user detects no delay
between the video of the physical world and the virtual elements,
but may detect a delay between actual head movement and the
head movement shown in the video of the physical world. Thus,
in choosing the appropriate AR system for a particular application,
one of the choices to be made is whether it is less adverse to have:
(a) a slight lack of synchronicity between the environment and
the synthetic elements (as in an OST); or (b) the graphics latency
applied to the video transmission of the environment, thus cre-
ating a very slight time lag between actual movement felt by the
body and movement detected by the user’s vision (as in a VST).
TECHNICAL CHALLENGES
One of the important technical challenges of AR is to make the
integration of the virtual elements into the non-synthetic envi-
ronment as seamless as possible, thus giving the user the illusion
of the co-existence of virtual and non-synthetic elements in a
“unique world” (Botella et al., 2010, p. 402). The illusion must
be maintained during the entire exposure, regardless of the angle
or height from which the user observes the virtual elements.
This requirement of complete fusion of the virtual elements into
the non-synthetic world implies significant programing, and this
challenge is further accentuated if the virtual elements are not sta-
tionary (e.g., a group of virtual spiders moving about a non-virtual
table).
AUGMENTED REALITY APPLICATIONS
As the technology supporting AR developed, AR has been
researched and used in various fields such as education (Ker-
awalla et al., 2006; Arvanitis et al., 2009), medicine (De Buck et al.,
2005), architecture (Grasset et al., 2001), maintenance (Schwald
and Laval, 2003), entertainment (Özbek et al., 2004), and disaster
management (Leebmann, 2006). In the field of mental health, the
use of new technologies holds many promises (e.g., Botella et al.,
2010). Like VR, AR allows patients to have easier access to mental
health services and, due to the strong representational and immer-
sion capability of these technologies, AR can enhance the patients’
engagement in the treatments (Coyle et al., 2007).
Augmented reality in exposure-based therapy against phobia
Advantages of ARET over VRET. In the treatment of phobias via
exposure-based treatments,ARET enjoys the same advantages over
IVET as VRET does (e.g., control over the scenario, safety, variety
of stimuli, confidentiality, repetition, and self-training). However,
as AR requires that only a few virtual elements be designed, the cost
of producing the environment is reduced. Furthermore, unlike VR,
AR does not “extract” the user from the real world (Dünser et al.,
2011). Thus, the AR user’s experience of the environment does not
hinge on his ability to “build” a sense of presence. Furthermore,
the user of an ARE is able to see his own body interact with the vir-
tual elements (versus seeing a virtual representation of his body;
see Figure 8). By embedding the virtual fear element in the real
environment and allowing a direct “own-body” perception of that
environment, the ecological validity of the scenario is increased
(Dünser et al., 2011). The implications of these advantages of AR
over VR include a less costly system that could elicit greater sense of
presence and better reality judgment of the objects (Botella et al.,
2005).
Efficacy of ARET in treating small animal phobia. Botella
et al. (2005) seem to have published the first study regarding the
treatment of a specific phobia using ARET. In a single subject
study applying the “one-session treatment” guidelines of Öst et al.
(1991b), they successfully treated a participant that initially met
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FIGURE 8 | Example of an ARET environment. Copyright. Labpsitec.
Universitat Jaume I. Spain.
the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) diagnosis
of small animal phobia (in this case, cockroaches). During the
course of the study, they demonstrated not only the ability of the
virtual cockroaches to activate a patient’s anxiety, but also a reduc-
tion in anxiety as the 1-h period of exposure progressed. More
specifically, important decreases in the scores of fear, avoidance,
and belief in catastrophic thought were measured (the types of
measures are shown at Table 1). Furthermore, after the treatment,
the participant was capable of approaching, interacting, and killing
live cockroaches. The results were maintained in a follow-up con-
ducted 1 month after the termination of the treatment. Although
this study showed promising results, the authors remark that they
needed to be confirmed with bigger samples and other pathologies
(Botella et al., 2005).
That same year, Juan et al. (2005) published a similar study
involving nine participants that met the DSM-IV-TR’s (American
Psychiatric Association, 2000) criteria for a specific phobia (five
participants feared cockroaches and four feared spiders). Using the
“one-session treatment”guidelines developed by Öst et al. (1991b),
the ARET protocol followed four distinct steps: (a) simple expo-
sure to a progressively increasing number of animals (cockroaches
or spiders, as applicable); (b) approaching a progressively increas-
ing number of the animals with the hand; (c) looking under four
boxes to uncover, or not, the feared animal(s); and (d) observing
the therapist repeatedly crush spiders or cockroaches and throw
them into a box, before doing so oneself. The study demonstrated
that the AR system was able to induce anxiety in individuals suf-
fering from spider or cockroach phobia. In all cases, the treatment
successfully reduced the participants’ fear and avoidance of the
target animal (the types of measures are shown at Table 1). In fact,
after the treatment, all of the participants were able to approach
the live animals, interact with them, and kill them by themselves.
The authors point out that their results are positive for the future
of AR in psychology, but that follow-on studies should include a
larger sample and a control group.
In 2010, Botella and colleagues published the results of another
study testing an AR system for the treatment of cockroach phobia
(Botella et al., 2010). Compared to the previous studies on ARET,
this one introduced a longer period of post-treatment retest (3, 6,
and 12 months). The six participants met the DSM-IV-TR (Amer-
ican Psychiatric Association, 2000) criteria for Specific Phobia
animal type (Cockroach Phobia), and the treatment was preceded
by two 60 min assessment periods during which: (a) the ADIS-
IV for specific phobia was administered; (b) the target behaviors
as well as the exposure hierarchy were established; and (c) the
participants completed other self-report measures. The intensive
exposure-based treatment, lasting up to 3 h, followed the “one-
session treatment” guidelines developed by Öst et al. (1991b).
Various measures of anxiety, avoidance and beliefs in negative
beliefs were taken pre-, per-, and post-treatment (the types of mea-
sures are shown at Table 1). The data collected in this study indicate
that the AR system was able to induce anxiety in all participants.
Post-treatment, all of the patients: (a) had improved significantly
in the level fear, avoidance and belief in negative thoughts related
to the main target behavior (the gains were maintained at 3, 6,
and 12-month follow-up periods); and (b) were able to interact
with real cockroaches (an act they were unable to carry out pre-
treatment). Thus, the results of this study support the finding of
the aforementioned ones, that is, ARET can be efficacious against
a specific animal phobia. However, the authors point to some of
the limitations of their study, namely, the small number of partic-
ipants, the absence of a control group, and the absence of a formal
test for cybersickness; the latter refers to a form of motion sick-
ness that can be experienced by the user of an immersive synthetic
environment.
That same year, Breton-Lopez and colleagues published a study
aiming to explore the ability of an AR system to induced anxiety
in six participants diagnosed with the DSM-IV-TR’s (American
Psychiatric Association, 2000) criteria of cockroach phobia. As
the secondary objective, the authors aimed to verify their system’s
ability to elicit a sense of presence and reality judgment. In the
ARE, the participants were exposed, in an order established to each
individual’s hierarchy of fears, to various elements programed in
the AR system. Throughout this process, the participants rated
their levels of anxiety, presence, and reality judgment (the types
of measures are shown at Table 1). Regarding the level of anxi-
ety, the results confirmed that the system is capable of inducing
anxiety in all participants, and that the levels of anxiety decreased
progressively during a prolonged exposure to the anxiety induc-
ing stimuli. The novel aspect of the findings is that the exposures
to “one insect in movement” and “more insects in movement”
elicited, in all participants, higher levels of anxiety than station-
ary insects. This result suggests that the movement of the animal
may be an important element to integrate in this type of applica-
tion. Regarding presence, the authors report that all participants
were able to “immerse themselves” in the AR environment and
that they attributed a high level of reality to the cockroaches.
Overall, the authors conclude that their results confirm the ability
of their AR system to contribute to the treatment of cockroach
phobia.
In 2011, Wrzesien and colleagues evaluated the Human Com-
puter Interface and clinical aspects of their AR system for cock-
roach phobia (Wrzesien et al., 2011b). To this end, five “clients”
(neither the diagnostic nor the instrument used for the diagnosis
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is reported) were treated through individual one-session (Öst,
2000) ARET clinical guidelines. The data collected showed post-
treatment improvements in the levels of anxiety, avoidance, and
belief in catastrophic thoughts (the types of measures are shown
at Table 1). More specifically, while the clients had not been able to
get closer than 1 or 2 m to a real cockroach prior to the treatment,
after the therapy, they were able to put a hand into a terrarium
with a real cockroach. The authors conclude that, although the
ARET system was effective in these clinical cases, the small size of
the sample and the absence of a control group should be improved
to confirm the results.
That same year, Wrzesien and colleagues published what seems
to be the first (preliminary) results concerning a comparative study
between IVET and ARET (Wrzesien et al., 2011a). For the purpose
of this study, 12 participants that met the DSM-IV-TR (Ameri-
can Psychiatric Association, 2000) criteria for a specific phobia to
small animals (spiders and cockroaches) were randomly assigned
to an IVET or an ARET group. The therapeutic sessions, which fol-
lowed the “one-session treatment” protocol (Öst, 2000), included
a single intensive exposure session of up to 3 h; the exposure exer-
cises had been defined previously and were ordered according to
each participant’s hierarchy of fears. Measures of avoidance, anx-
iety, and irrational thoughts were taken throughout the protocol
(the types of measures are shown at Table 1). While the results
of this pilot study suggest that both ARET and IVET are clini-
cally effective, some differences were noted between the groups.
For both groups, the clinical measures of anxiety, avoidance, and
avoidance behavior decreased significantly after the therapeutic
session. However, the clinical measure of belief in catastrophic
thought only improved significantly in the ARET group. Between
the groups, the authors report a significantly higher improvement
of the avoidance score of the IVET group, but no improvement
differences in either, the anxiety, the belief in catastrophic thought
or the behavior avoidance measures. The authors suggest that the
small size of the clinical sample may have played a role in the
differences between the groups.
Botella et al. (2011) published the results of another single case
study combining a serious game on a mobile phone with ARET. As
this study involved AR in the treatment of a phobia (in this case,
cockroach phobia), it is mentioned here. However, the combina-
tion of protocols goes beyond the scope of this paper; thus, this
study is not reviewed.
In 2013, Wrzesien and colleagues tested a new display tech-
nology they called therapeutic lamp (TL), a projection-based AR
system for therapy for small-animal phobia (Wrzesien et al., 2013).
Unlike the head-level AR systems, their system has the advantage of
not requiring the use of a head mounted display. The non-clinical
sample of 26 volunteers underwent a single exposure-based ther-
apy protocol comprised of 12 exercises (from least to most anxiety
inducing). The results indicated that anxiety scores, although rel-
atively high at the beginning of each exercise, dropped by the end
and after the session. Furthermore, the participants’ belief in their
capacity to face a cockroach had increased significantly after the
session (the types of measures are shown at Table 1). The authors
conclude that TL can be a useful therapeutic tool for other psycho-
logical disorders, but that their results need to be validated with
phobia patients.
About the types of phobias treated by ARET. All of the cases
of ARET research projects found in preparation for this paper
involved small animal phobia. One of the factors behind this
restricted use of ARET may be related to the use of visual mark-
ers to track the orientation and position of the user relative to the
scene. Indeed, the use of visual markers implies that as soon as part
of the marker is not in the user’s field of view, the virtual stimu-
lus disappears completely. This technological limitation prevents
the use of ARET in treating certain phobias (e.g., larger animal
phobias, the fear of public speaking, the fear of thunder and light-
ning). While it may be difficult for cyberpsychology laboratories
working without significant technical support to implement alter-
native tracking technologies, it could be constructive for those
who do benefit from such support to experiment ARET proto-
cols using alternative tracking methods (for examples, refer to the
section titled “enabling technologies”); such developments may
unlock ARET’s access to many potentially useful treatment proto-
cols. One of these may be the treatment of social phobia. Presently,
some of the VEs destined to provide support in the treatment of
social phobia rely on public speaking tasks. Depending on the tar-
get population, the environment often consists of public speaking
rooms such as auditoriums, conference rooms, and classrooms. In
this type of situation, one advantage of ARET is that the exposure
could take place in the actual places the patient encounters his dif-
ficulties (e.g., an accounting officer who finds it difficult to present
the financial results to the board members, or a child who isn’t
able to present in class). Thus, assuming that the required tracking
technology is developed, AR could provide such in situ training.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this paper was to review the move from VRET to
ARET. Unlike VR, which entails a complete VE, AR limits itself
to producing certain virtual elements to then merge them into
the view of the physical world. Although the general public may
only have become aware of AR in the last few years, AR type
applications have been around since beginning of the twentieth
century. Since then, technological developments have enabled an
ever increasing level of seamless integration of virtual and physical
elements into one view. Like VR, AR allows the exposure to stim-
uli which, due to various reasons, may not be suitable for real-life
scenarios. As such, AR has proven itself to be a medium through
which individuals suffering from specific phobia can be exposed
“safely” to the object(s) of their fear, without the costs associ-
ated with programing complete VEs. Thus, ARET can offer an
efficacious alternative to some less advantageous exposure-based
therapies. Above and beyond presenting what has been accom-
plished in ARET, this paper also raised some AR related issues, and
proposes potential avenues to be followed. These include the def-
inition of an AR related term, the type of measures to be used to
qualify the experience of ARE users, as well as the development of
alternative geospatial referencing systems, which themselves, may
open the door to other ARET applications, such as the treatment
of social phobia. Overall, it may be said that the use of ARET,
although promising, is still in its infancy but that, given a contin-
ued cooperation between clinical and technical teams, ARET has
the potential of going well beyond the treatment of small animal
phobia.
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